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This chapter considers, first, whether substantial transfer mispricing by 
major corporations that contributes to a loss of at least US$160 billion a 
year to developing countries is plausible in the context of total likely 
corporate profits earned worldwide in a year.1
Second, it tests whether corporate activities in developing countries 
and in the extractive industries in particular might be especially prone to 
this abuse.
Third, it considers whether this sum could be hidden from view 
within the accounts or financial statements of the multinational corpo-
rations (MNCs) that might be perpetrating the mispricing.
Fourth, it explores the possibility that the MNCs might use secrecy 
jurisdictions to assist in hiding these transactions from view.
In each case, it is suggested that the behavior described is plausible 
and that, as a consequence, losses of the estimated amount are also plau-
sible, although not proven to exist as a result of this work.
Richard Murphy
Accounting for the 
Missing Billions
Some of the data used in this chapter have been researched for the Mapping the Faultlines 
Project of the Tax Justice Network (TJN), financed by the Ford Foundation, the results 
of which are being published at http://www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/. The author is 
research director of that project.
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Introduction
Since 2000, a body of literature, mainly emanating from nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs), has developed suggesting that systematic 
transfer mispricing is taking place within the world’s MNCs. This lit-
erature asserts, in the first instance, that the flows in question abuse 
international standards on transfer pricing implicit in the arm’s-length 
pricing rules of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) and that the abuse results in significant loss in revenues 
to developing countries.2
Estimates of the loss vary. Christian Aid’s estimate (2008) finds that 
transfer mispricing and related abuses result in the loss of corporate tax 
revenues to the developing world of at least US$160 billion a year, a fig-
ure that, it notes, is more than 1.5 times the combined aid budgets of the 
rich world, which totaled US$103.7 billion in 2007.
Raymond Baker (2005) proposes that total annual illicit financial flows 
(IFFs) might amount to US$1 trillion, asserting, in the process, that these 
flows pass illegally across borders aided by an elaborate dirty money struc-
ture comprising tax havens, financial secrecy jurisdictions, dummy corpo-
rations, anonymous trusts and foundations, money laundering tech-
niques, and loopholes intentionally left in the laws of western countries.3 
Of this amount, Baker estimates that some US$500 billion a year flows 
from developing and transitional economies. He suggests that at least 65 
percent of these flows may be accounted for by transfer mispricing.
Baker’s findings have been endorsed by Kar and Cartwright-Smith 
(2008), who estimate that, in 2006, developing countries lost US$858.6 
billion to US$1.1 trillion in illicit financial outflows. Note that the term 
illicit is appropriately used in this chapter. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines illegal as contrary to or forbidden by law, but illicit as forbidden 
by law, rules, or custom. The distinction is important. Transfer mispric-
ing is illicit; it is contrary to known rules or customs, but, in many of the 
transactions of concern, it is not illegal because, as noted later in this 
chapter, double tax agreements (DTAs) that would make it so are not in 
place, nor are relevant local laws.
NGOs and civil society organizations are not the only source of litera-
ture proposing that transfer mispricing might be used to reallocate prof-
its across jurisdictions. There is a substantial body of academic literature 
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asserting that this practice is commonplace, although this literature does 
not focus on developing and transitional economies in coming to its 
conclusion. For example, Dischinger and Riedel (2008) state that intan-
gible assets such as patents and trademarks are increasingly seen as the 
key to competitive success and as the drivers of corporate profit, but also 
constitute a major source of the opportunity for profit shifting in MNCs 
because of the highly nontransparent transfer pricing process. They 
argue that this provides MNCs with an incentive to locate intangible 
property in jurisdictions with relatively low corporate tax rates. They 
find evidence to support this activity, showing that the lower a subsid-
iary’s tax rate relative to other members of a multinational group, the 
higher the subsidiary’s level of intangible asset investment.
Harry Huizinga (2009), in a wide-ranging review, indicates that 
MNCs can relocate profits in a number of ways. First, they could change 
real activity, that is, where they locate; second, they could manipulate 
transfer prices; third, they could choose the location of intangible assets 
and associated income such as royalties (as Dischinger and Riedel 
emphasize); or, fourth, they could choose the location of their headquar-
ters to create possible favorable international double taxation conse-
quences. Having reviewed the current literature within Europe on this 
issue, Huizinga concludes that international profit shifting erodes the 
corporate tax base in Europe, that the best approach to tackling the 
problem is to eliminate incentives for firms to shift profits, and that 
international policy cooperation is necessary to achieve this.
Notably, the academic studies, in contrast to those by NGOs, find that 
the scale of income shifted is relatively small, only a few percentage 
points, at most, of the tax base. For example, in chapter 4 in this volume, 
Fuest and Riedel posit that Baker (2005), Kar and Cartwright-Smith 
(2008), Christian Aid (2008), and others all overstate the extent of trans-
fer mispricing, although all these authors reject the assertion because 
Fuest and Riedel make a fundamental error by assuming that overpriced 
inflows and underpriced outflows may be netted off for the purposes of 
assessing resulting tax losses, when, in fact, these sums should be aggre-
gated for this purpose. In chapter 10 in this volume, Nitsch also ques-
tions the same group of estimates, suggesting that the forging of docu-
mentation relating to IFFs may not be motivated by taxes. It is a curious 
argument if the consequence is tax loss whatever the motive.
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There are, however, reasonable methodological grounds that explain 
why this low level of transfer mispricing is reported by academic studies, 
all these grounds deriving from significant methodological weaknesses 
in the studies.
First, most academic studies on this issue use database information 
supplied by agencies that summarize accounting data; as a result, they do 
not use the accounts themselves as their data source, losing considerable 
vital information on tax as a consequence (see below).
Second, these data sets tend to result in the use of pretax profit as a 
proxy for taxable income—which is rarely appropriate—and in the use 
of profit and loss account tax charges as a proxy for taxes paid. This use 
of the profit and loss account tax charge as an indicator of taxes paid is 
almost always inappropriate. This is because these charges are invari-
ably made up of two parts. The first is the current tax charge. This is the 
tax that a company actually believes will be paid within 12 months of a 
period end as a result of the profit arising during the accounting period. 
It is, therefore, a reasonable measure of the tax liability accruing during 
the period. The second component of the tax charge in a profit and loss 
account is described as the deferred tax charge. Deferred tax is not tax 
at all. Rather, it represents an accounting entry relating to taxes that 
may potentially (but will not definitely) be paid in future periods as a 
consequence of transactions that have occurred in the current period. 
So, for example, if the tax relief on the acquisition of fixed assets in the 
period exceeds the charge for depreciation on these assets in the profit 
and loss account, there is a potential deferred tax charge in future peri-
ods if the situation were to reverse. The liability is provided in the 
accounts, even though it may never arise simply because the situation 
may not reverse. Similarly, if transfer mispricing can defer the recogni-
tion of profit in a high-tax parent-company location by the current 
relocation of the profits in question to a secrecy jurisdiction where tax 
is not currently due on the profits, then a deferred tax provision can be 
made for the potential liability arising on the eventual remittance of the 
profits to the parent company, but there is no guarantee that this sum 
will ever be due. As a consequence, many consider deferred tax charges 
as accounting fiction and as unreliable, and they are, curiously, the only 
liability included in the set of accounts whether or not there is any pros-
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pect of their settlement. In this case, to include them in the tax charge 
in considering the real taxation paid by corporations is seriously mis-
leading and undermines many existing studies of effective taxation 
rates among MNCs. Thus, the methodology used in these studies is 
inappropriate for appraising the transfer mispricing that these studies 
survey.
Using accounting data from the companies, Murphy (2008) shows 
that the largest 50 companies in the FTSE 100 increased their net deferred 
tax provisions (that is, the cumulative provisions that are made by a 
company for deferred taxation arising over the period of trading to date 
and that are shown as a long-term liability on balance sheets) from £8 
billion to £46 billion between 2000 and 2006. This hints at the existence 
of significant tax avoidance that database information on the taxation 
charges in company accounts is unlikely to reveal.
The room for disagreement is thus substantial on whether there is, or 
not, a major transfer mispricing issue that might have particular rele-
vance to developing nations and in which secrecy jurisdictions may play 
a significant part in a way that policy change may need to address.4
It is not the purpose of this chapter to resolve whether the mispricing 
takes place or not. The chapter has another purpose, which is approached 
from an accounting and auditing perspective. An audit tests the credibil-
ity of reported data. This is not a test of whether the variable is right or 
wrong: financial audits do not offer an opinion on this to their users. 
Instead, the audit seeks to test whether the variable may be true and fair. 
In seeking to prove or disprove the credibility of data, auditors have, for 
some time, realized that a microapproach, that is, verification based on 
transactional data alone, is unlikely to provide all (and, in some cases, 
any) of the data needed to determine the likely credibility of the overall 
stated position. The alternative approach involves verifying data by test-
ing the credibility of sums in total.
This testing can take a number of forms. For example, do the data fall 
within the known range of plausible outcomes based on the third-party 
data that are available? Alternatively, are the data within the likely pat-
tern of outcomes that may be observed within the entity that is being 
tested? And are the total data plausible in that they are consistent with 
other known totals?
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Importantly and, in the current case, crucially, all such tests must take 
into consideration the broader commercial, regulatory, legal, and risk 
environments in which the transactions or balances being considered 
occur. An auditor is not allowed to consider numerical data in isolation; 
the use of such data must be contextualized.
This chapter seeks, first, to test the hypothesis according to which 
transfer mispricing by major corporations that gives rise to tax losses 
amounting to at least US$160 billion a year among developing countries 
is plausible in the context of the total likely worldwide corporate profits 
in a year during the same period of reference (that is, pre-2008).
Second, it tests whether corporate activities in developing countries 
and, particularly, in the extractive industries may be especially prone to 
this abuse.
Third, it considers whether this sum may be hidden from view within 
the accounts and financial statements of the MNCs that might be perpe-
trating the mispricing.
Fourth, it explores the possibility that MNCs may use secrecy juris-
dictions to assist in hiding these transactions from view.
The rest of the chapter is divided into five sections. The next section 
explores the tax rates that MNCs have and are likely to face; it shows that 
much of the existing literature on this subject offers misleading indica-
tions of likely effective tax rates.
In the subsequent section, the state of transfer pricing regulation and 
practice within the extractive industries is explored on the basis of a 
range of sources on which the author has worked over a number of years.
The following section looks at the way in which MNCs are structured 
and how this structure interacts with the corporate and tax law of the 
locations that host some of these MNCs; it also contrasts these relation-
ships with the requirements of International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards (IFRSs), which are the standards that govern the financial report-
ing of most such entities now that U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles are converging with the standards issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board.
The penultimate section considers the nature of secrecy jurisdictions. 
Data on the use of such locations by MNCs are presented. The role of the 
Big Four accounting firms is touched upon.
The evidence is drawn together in the concluding section.
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Multinational Corporations and Their Tax Rates
Data sources
This part of the chapter seeks to compare the corporate tax rates offered 
by a wide range of jurisdictions over time. The basic data source for the 
time series data on tax rates used in this report is the annual corporate 
tax rate reviews published by KPMG, a Big Four firm of accountants and 
business advisers. KPMG has been publishing the reviews since 1996, 
and, although the jurisdictions reviewed have varied slightly over the 
period, the data have always covered between 60 and 70 jurisdictions in 
each annual report up to and through 2008, all of which have been 
included in the current survey. The KPMG data consistently cover 30 
OECD countries and the 15 preenlargement members of the European 
Union (EU). The other jurisdictions surveyed vary widely. A consistent 
feature is that few of the places are recognized secrecy jurisdictions. The 
data on populations and gross domestic product (GDP) used in this part 
of the chapter were extracted from the CIA Factbook in July 2009.5
As a result of the omission of tax rate data for secrecy jurisdictions, an 
alternative data source for these locations has been used. Given that the 
KPMG data were, without doubt, produced for marketing purposes, 
another, similar source has been sought. The source the author of the 
chapter has settled on is a data set downloaded from OCRA Worldwide.6 
These data, which were extracted in November 2008, relate to the corpo-
rate tax rates of secrecy jurisdictions as applied to foreign source income. 
This is relevant for the purpose of this review because one is concerned 
with transfer pricing, and the income that will pass through these loca-
tions in connection with intragroup trades is likely to be considered for-
eign source income in these jurisdictions; the tax rates provided by 
OCRA will therefore be the appropriate tax rates to consider.
Methodology
The KPMG data are summarized in table 9A.1.7 The data are categorized 
according to the following characteristics for the purposes of the 
analysis:
1.  Whether or not the jurisdiction was a member of the OECD
2.  Whether or not the jurisdiction was one of the 15 EU preenlargement 
states (the EU15)
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3,  Whether the jurisdiction was large or small (for these purposes, a 
large jurisdiction has a population over 15 million, which splits the 
data into two broadly equal parts)
4.  Whether the jurisdiction had a high or low GDP per head (for these 
purposes, a high GDP is above US$25,000 in 2009, which splits the 
data into two roughly equivalent parts)
5.  Whether or not the jurisdiction had a high proportion of govern-
ment spending in relation to GDP (in this case, 30 percent govern-
ment spending as a proportion of GDP indicates high spending)
The categories have been chosen broadly to reflect developed and 
less-developed nations (the developed nations are the OECD members) 
and large and small jurisdictions. Categorizing according to a high or 
low tax spend also broadly reflects the effectiveness of the tax system in 
the jurisdiction because it is likely that those jurisdictions with low 
spending had ineffective tax collection systems given that this is com-
monplace in developing countries.
The average data for each year have then been calculated for each of 
these groups. The resulting data set is reproduced in table 9A.2.8
Initial results
The initial results are best presented graphically. An overall summary of 
the data is shown in figure 9.1.
There is a strong and, in almost all cases, persistent downward trend 
in nominal corporate tax rates over the period under review. This, how-
ever, does not reveal much of the subtlety inherent in what is happening, 
which greater exploration of the data reveals.
First, with regard to the OECD countries (of which the EU15 are an 
effective subset), there has been a significant decline in notional rates 
that has seen them converge with the rates offered by the other, non-
OECD countries. Rather surprisingly, in 2008, OECD country rates fell, 
on average (weighted by the number of countries), below the average 
rate of non-OECD countries. Given the substantial differential of more 
than 6 percentage points in 1997, this is a remarkable change. The play-
ing field, much talked about in OECD circles over many years, appears to 
have been leveled.
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Figure 9.1. Corporate Tax Rates, Initial Results, 1997–2008
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Source: Author compilation based on data of Tax Tools and Resources (database), KPMG, Zug, Switzerland, http://www.
kpmg.com/Global/en/WhatWeDo/Tax/tax-tools-and-resources/Pages/default.aspx.
This story is not repeated elsewhere. The data for large and small 
jurisdictions do, for example, show a persistent gap in tax rates between 
these two groups, the extent of which marginally increases during the 
period. The trend in rates seems clear: smaller jurisdictions (those with 
populations of less than 15 million people) would appear to wish to cre-
ate competitive advantage by having lower corporate tax rates.
This trend is also found by comparing jurisdictions with high GDP per 
head and jurisdictions with low GDP per head. In this case, it is, however, 
clear that the margin is closing: a level playing field is being created between 
these sets of jurisdictions. This is not surprising: there is significant overlap 
between the high-GDP jurisdictions and the OECD countries.
AU: 
Need 
2 key 
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here
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A comparison of jurisdictions with high and low state spending in pro-
portion to GDP shows an even more marked contrast. Quite surprisingly, 
by 2008, the jurisdictions with high state spending (in excess of 30 percent 
in proportion to GDP) were offering lower notional corporate tax rates 
than jurisdictions with a lower (under 30 percent) proportion of GDP 
going to state spending. The implications of the change would appear 
clear: this is the consequence of a shift in the tax burden in high-spending 
jurisdictions from corporations to individuals that was rapid and marked.
These findings are significant. They confirm what other literature (of 
which there is a considerable body) has also shown, that is, that corpo-
rate tax rates are steadily falling. However, unlike most surveys of such 
rates, which are concentrated most often solely on EU or OECD coun-
tries, these data show that the issue of changing corporate tax rates is 
more complex than one may suspect at first sight.9 There are strong dif-
ferences in the trends that a simple analysis does not reveal.
Even so, the analysis noted here does not show the whole picture with 
regard to notional tax rates because a simple averaging methodology has 
been used to present the data. This means that the tax rates surveyed 
have been totaled over the set of jurisdictions and divided by the number 
of jurisdictions within the set. This standard methodology is flawed. To 
assume that all jurisdictions stand equal in the assessment of changes in 
average tax rates is inappropriate: it would seem that weighting should 
be an essential part of any analysis.
There are a number of ways to weight these data. The usual method is 
simply to attribute an equal weight to each jurisdiction. This would be 
misleading. The method gives an undue emphasis to the tax rates of 
small economies with limited populations. Because such economies are 
frequently associated with secrecy jurisdiction activity, there is an obvi-
ous risk of inherent bias. It is precisely for this reason that an alternative 
weighting has been used in the current exercise, resulting in a perspec-
tive that is different from the one usually provided by analyses of this 
sort, which are undertaken, in most cases, by members of the accounting 
profession, who have an inherent bias (as noted elsewhere below) toward 
secrecy jurisdiction activity. As a necessary alternative, a different weight-
ing has been used here. We have weighted by the GDP of the jurisdiction 
offering the tax rate. There is a good reason for this choice: GDP is a 
reasonable indication of the size of national markets, and this is a good 
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proxy for the capacity to generate profits. Because this exercise is focused 
on the taxation of profits in particular locations, this weighting is likely 
to indicate the effective tax rates that companies are seeking to avoid by 
transfer pricing activity given that the taxation of profits is the motive 
for using transfer pricing. The only other viable method that might indi-
cate the impact of profit shifting through transfer mispricing is to weight 
tax rates by the population of the jurisdictions: such an exercise would 
indicate a shift from locations with high populations, requiring taxation 
revenue to service local need, to locations with low population, requir-
ing little taxation to service the needs of the population (this is also, of 
course, a characteristic of secrecy jurisdictions). This second weighting 
method is also considered in the analysis offered below.
Weighting by GDP supplies a different picture of average tax rates, as 
shown in figure 9.2. The weighting in figure 9.2 has been carried out 
using notional 2009 GDPs expressed in U.S. dollars as a consistent rank-
ing mechanism that is unlikely to have introduced distortion because 
relative positions are unlikely to have changed materially for this pur-
pose over time.
Average tax rates fall within the ranges noted within the standard 
economic literature mentioned above. This literature gives, however, a 
misleading view. Because of the presence of the biggest economy in the 
Figure 9.2.  Corporate Tax Rates, Weighted by GDP, 1997–2008
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%
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Source: Author compilation using 2009 GDP data taken from World Factbook (database), Central Intelligence 
Agency, Washington, DC, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
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world (the United States), which has one of the highest effective tax 
rates on corporate profits in the world (notionally stated, as are all rates 
used here) if federal and state taxes are combined, and many other 
major countries that combine high absolute GDPs and high tax rates, 
the average corporate tax rate weighted by GDP is much higher than the 
apparent simple average; in 2008, the difference was about 5 percent.
This is significant. Murphy (2008) finds that the effective current 
rates of corporation tax paid by the largest 50 companies in the FTSE 
100 fell steadily, from 26 percent in 2000 to about 22 percent in 2006, 
both compared with a headline rate of 30 percent. This closing rate dif-
ferential of 8 percent looks substantially more significant, however, if it 
is compared with the worldwide weighted average tax rating of about 34 
percent in 2007 calculated on the basis noted above. A 12 percent dif-
ferential, assuming (as is likely) that many of these companies have sig-
nificant sales in the United States, seems high indeed.
Including data from the OCRA data set on some secrecy jurisdictions—
only those secrecy jurisdictions on which OCRA provides data have been 
used in the survey discussed hereafter, and only those on which OCRA 
provides specific rate data have been included in the exercise—changes the 
perspective on these data once again.10 Data are only available for 2008; so, 
trend analysis cannot be offered, but, even so, the position is quite differ-
ent. The data are summarized in table 9A.3.11 The summary in table 9.1 is 
based on the 90 jurisdictions used for computational purposes. The equiv-
alent data, excluding secrecy jurisdiction locations, are shown in table 9.2.
Table 9.1. Summary Data: Corporate Tax Rate, Including Secrecy 
Jurisdiction Locations, 2008 
percent
Description Rate
Notional simple average of corporate tax rates 20.30
Corporate tax rate weighted by GDP 32. 10
Corporate tax rate weighted by population 29.90
Source: Author compilation based on data of Jurisdiction Centre (database), OCRA World-
wide, Isle of Man, United Kingdom, http://www.ocra.com/jurisdictions/index.asp; Tax 
Tools and Resources (database), KPMG, Zug, Switzerland, http://www.kpmg.com/Global/ 
en/WhatWeDo/Tax/tax-tools-and-resources/Pages/default.aspx; World Development 
Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators/ (for GDP).
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The secrecy jurisdictions all have 0 percent tax rates. They therefore 
do not change the weighted data, but they do significantly reduce the 
simple average data. It is obvious that excluding secrecy jurisdiction data 
from a sampling of average corporate tax rates, as has been conventional 
in most academic reviews to date, makes a substantial difference in the 
presentation of information. If the simple averaging method is used and 
secrecy jurisdictions are excluded from review, a quite misleading per-
spective on current likely effective tax rates is presented.
There is one computation to note. For several of the jurisdictions in the 
KPMG data set, OCRA notes that a differential tax rate is available for 
foreign source income. For these jurisdictions alone and only if OCRA 
could indicate the alternative rate that was available, we have undertaken 
further analysis using this rate for foreign source income. The jurisdictions 
for which this has been done are Hong Kong SAR, China; Hungary; Ice-
land; Israel; Luxembourg; the United Kingdom, where limited liability 
partnerships are tax transparent; and the United States, where limited lia-
bility companies offer the same fiscal transparency. Singapore and Swit-
zerland offer differential rates, but we do not restate them here because 
OCRA does not indicate the alternative rate, which varies according to the 
circumstances. Our results are shown in table 9.3.
The resulting tax rate data weighted by GDP look much closer to the 
tax rate actually found if one examines effective corporate tax rates 
declared by companies, as noted by Murphy (2008), than to any tax rate 
data one may present by undertaking calculations weighted simply by 
Table 9.2. Summary Data: Corporate Tax Rate, Excluding Secrecy 
Jurisdiction Locations, 2008 
percent
Description Rate
Notional simple average of corporate tax rates 26.77
Corporate tax rate weighted by GDP  32. 10
Corporate tax rate weighted by population  29.90
Source: Author compilation based on data of Jurisdiction Centre (database), OCRA World-
wide, Isle of Man, United Kingdom, http://www.ocra.com/jurisdictions/index.asp; Tax 
Tools and Resources (database), KPMG, Zug, Switzerland, http://www.kpmg.com/Global/ 
en/WhatWeDo/Tax/tax-tools-and-resources/Pages/default.aspx; World Development 
Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators/ (for GDP).
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the number of jurisdictions based on the notional tax rates of all juris-
dictions that are not secrecy jurisdictions. Ring-fences increase the num-
ber of jurisdictions offering low tax rates. In combination with the 
weighted and secrecy jurisdiction data, this understanding adds a new 
approach to analyzing these data.
The developing-country perspective
A final dimension to this issue needs to be noted. The KPMG data 
include some transition countries, but few developing countries, and 
Africa is, for example, seriously underrepresented. Keen and Mansour 
(2009) provide some data to correct this omission, although only in 
graphical form, as shown in figure 9.3.
The statutory corporate income tax rate plot relating to tax rates is 
relevant here. Simple averaging of the tax rates in Africa (with all the 
inherent faults in this process, which is used here, as elsewhere in most 
economic literature on this issue) shows that corporate income tax 
rates in Africa fell from 44.0 percent, on average, in 1990 to 33.2 per-
cent in 2005. The rate of 33.2 percent might compare favorably (only 
barely) with the weighted average rate noted above, but it does not 
compare well with any other. The reality is that, on the basis of simple 
weighted averages, Africa has high corporate tax rates on profits, at 
least 5 percent above the KPMG simple weighted average for the same 
year and much higher than the weighted average, including secrecy 
jurisdictions, in 2008.
Table 9.3. Summary Data: Tax Rate on Foreign Source Income, 
Selected Secrecy Jurisdiction Locations, 2008 
percent
Description Rate
Notional simple average of corporate tax rates 18.48
Corporate tax rate weighted by GDP  20.70
Corporate tax rate weighted by population  27.20
Source: Author compilation based on data of Jurisdiction Centre (database), OCRA World-
wide, Isle of Man, United Kingdom, http://www.ocra.com/jurisdictions/index.asp; Tax 
Tools and Resources (database), KPMG, Zug, Switzerland, http://www.kpmg.com/Global/ 
en/WhatWeDo/Tax/tax-tools-and-resources/Pages/default.aspx; World Development 
Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators/ (for GDP).
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These findings are important. It is likely that the incentive to avoid 
taxes through transfer pricing is based on two considerations. The first is 
the differential between the tax rates of the countries through which 
ownership of the goods might pass as part of the transfer pricing supply 
chain. The greater the differential in tax rates across jurisdictions in the 
intragroup supply chain, it may be suggested, the greater the prospect 
that a group of companies will profit from transfer mispricing. The sec-
ond consideration likely to feature significantly in the decision process 
on mispricing is the chance that the activity may take place without dis-
covery within the intragroup supply chain. The first issue is considered 
here; the second, in later parts of this chapter.
The literature that finds evidence for substantial IFFs relating to 
transfer mispricing also finds evidence that this process is facilitated by 
the existence of secrecy jurisdictions, most or all of which offer no taxa-
tion on foreign source income (Baker 2005; Christian Aid 2008; and so 
on). As the data noted above show, this 0 rate tax offering has, over time, 
had a slightly diminishing impact as simple weighted average tax rates 
have fallen, but, with the rates still hovering at around 27 percent in 
many of the measures noted, the differential remains large.
Figure 9.3. Corporate Income Tax, Africa, 1980–2005
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Source: Author compilation based on Keen and Mansour (2009) and data of International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation 
and International Monetary Fund.
Note: CIT = corporate income tax. Revenue excludes oil, gas, and mining companies.
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The differential is even more significant if comparison is made with 
the simple weighted average tax rates in Africa. The incentive to tax avoid 
through transfer mispricing from that continent would appear to be 
strong, a theme to which we return below.
What does need to be assessed is whether the incentive based on tax 
rate differentials is sufficient to justify the claimed US$160 billion or 
more of transfer mispricing that is said to take place each year. Analytical 
review techniques such as are found in auditing are used here with the 
objective of testing whether the claimed audit outcome (in this case, that 
transfer mispricing results in losses to developing countries of US$160 
billion a year) is within the plausible range of data outcomes that popu-
lation information implies may be likely.
It is proposed that, in analytical review terms, the estimates of trans-
fer mispricing would be considered plausible if the total estimated 
amount of tax lost to transfer mispricing were materially less than the 
amount of tax lost as measured by the differential between weighted 
average headline tax rates (which would indicate tax due if corporations 
were tax compliant) and the tax likely actually to be paid calculated using 
likely cash paid tax rates, as noted above. In this context, tax compliance 
is defined as an effort to pay the right amount of tax (but no more) in the 
right place at the right time, where right means that the economic sub-
stance of the transactions undertaken coincides with the place and form 
in which they are reported for taxation purposes.
Data on tax rates have already been developed above. The other data 
needed are as follows:
•  A measure of world GDP, because the trade that is transfer mispriced 
is a proportion of world GDP, and that proportion must be credible
•  An indication of corporate profits as a proportion of world GDP, 
because, ultimately, it is profits that are shifted as a result of transfer 
mispricing
These data, if combined, will generate the following:
•  A measure of worldwide corporate taxable profits
•  If weighted by the tax rate data noted above, the measure of world-
wide corporate taxable profits will give measures of both the likely tax 
paid and the tax lost because tax rates weighted by GDP are not paid 
by major corporations, as noted above
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Worldwide GDP was approximately US$61 trillion in 2008.12 The 
IFFs that give rise to the estimated tax loss calculated by Christian Aid 
(2008) amount to between US$850 billion and US$1 trillion a year, rep-
resenting, in some cases, sums as high as 10 percent of GDP (Kar and 
Cartwright-Smith 2008). These calculations are based on actual trade 
data. Illicit flows of this scale are considered plausible for the purposes of 
this chapter.
As Murphy (2010a) notes, the U.K. tax authorities estimate that 15 
percent of total value added tax due on U.K. gross sales and imports in 
2008–09 was not collected (HMRC 2010). The part not collected was 
associated with what might reasonably be described as IFFs using the 
definitions offered by Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008). By extrapola-
tion, the total tax loss over the entire U.K. economy was at least 5 percent 
of GDP in that case. The United Kingdom is considered a well-regulated 
economy with low levels of tax evasion although the domestic tax 
authority acknowledges that one-sixth of total gross commercial finan-
cial flows are outside the tax system. It is widely accepted that a signifi-
cant amount of lost value added tax arises as a result of international 
unrecorded trading flows and illicitly recorded transactions, a matter 
that has been of considerable concern in the United Kingdom and the 
rest of the EU for many years. In this circumstance, the estimates of IFFs 
in developing countries that Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) provide 
appear to be well within the plausible data range based on comparison 
with alternative reliable information.
Total corporate added value in the U.K. economy represented by the 
gross operating surplus of corporations is in excess of 20 percent of 
GDP.13 In 2008, this gross operating surplus of corporations amounted to 
£339 billion. Yet, this sum is stated before charges such as interest are 
offset against profit. Total corporation tax revenues in the same year were 
£46 billion.14 On gross value added, this implies an effective tax rate of 
13.6 percent. However, Murphy (2008) states that an effective average tax 
rate of about 22 percent should be anticipated. If this latter rate were 
applied to tax paid, the gross added value after the interest offset is 
reduced to £210 billion, a sum that was 14.5 percent of U.K. GDP in 2008.
Data on the same ratio in the United States for 2006, 2007, and 2008 
imply that corporate profits were lower, less than 11 percent of GDP and 
on a downward trend (12.0 percent in 2006, 10.9 percent in 2007, and 
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9.4 percent in 2008).15 Nonetheless, this excludes the profits of private 
companies (which are included in the U.K. data). In this case, one may 
presume that the two ratios are largely consistent, and a total profit rate 
of approximately 10 percent of GDP might be considered to be associ-
ated with large entities likely to undertake multinational trade. This is 
probably a reasonable estimate of global corporate profits given that the 
United Kingdom and the United States are the two largest centers for the 
location of MNCs in the world. Assuming that this rate may be indica-
tive of worldwide rates, this leads one to suspect that, based on world-
wide GDP of US$61 trillion, corporate profits may be conservatively 
estimated at a total of approximately US$6 trillion in 2008.
We have used secondary sources to check this conclusion. Global data 
on profits are remarkably difficult to source. However, McKinsey has 
published a review of the after-tax profits of the top 2,000 companies in 
the world in 2006 and established that the after-tax earnings of this 
group in that year were US$3.2 trillion (Dietz, Reibestein, and Walter 
2008). Murphy (2008) finds that declared tax rates for companies regis-
tered in the United Kingdom and quoted on the stock exchange for that 
year averaged 25.8 percent (this rate reflecting their worldwide rates and 
not merely the rate applicable in the United Kingdom), which suggests 
that the worldwide pretax profits of the McKinsey sample may be US$4.3 
trillion. This figure is, of course, somewhat lower than US$6 trillion, but 
a sample of 2,000 companies is also somewhat lower than the total pop-
ulation of MNCs. There are, for example, more than 2,200 companies 
quoted in the United Kingdom alone (London Stock Exchange 2010). 
That 2,000 companies might represent 72 percent of total global profits 
likely to be of concern does seem plausible, however, and this is consid-
ered strong supporting evidence that the estimates of global profits are 
reasonable.
On this global profit estimate of US$6 trillion, the tax due at weighted 
average tax rates based on GDP noted above (32.1 percent) might be 
about US$1.9 trillion. If secrecy jurisdictions and ring-fences are consid-
ered, this might fall to a tax figure as low as US$1.2 trillion at a rate of 
20.1 percent, as noted above. The rates are selected from among those 
noted above because, first, it is suggested that the average tax rate 
weighted by GDP indicates the taxes that would be due if companies 
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were tax compliant, that is, if they paid the right amount of tax (but no 
more) in the right place at the right time, where right means that the 
economic substance of the transactions undertaken coincides with the 
place and form in which they are reported for taxation purposes and that 
profits arise where third-party sales (for which GDP is a proxy) occur. 
Second, the rate, including secrecy jurisdictions and ring-fences, reflects 
the reality of the tax system that, this chapter notes, MNCs can actually 
exploit, that is, the rate is used in recognition of the fact that secrecy does 
allow the relocation of profits and that ring-fences for foreign earnings 
might be used to apply low tax rates to profits reallocated by transfer 
mispricing techniques behind the veil of secrecy.
It is plausible that the differential in taxes paid, based on the varying 
assumptions, of some US$700 billion might include transfer mispricing 
effects of US$160 billion that have been claimed (Christian Aid 2008). 
Transfer mispricing abuse would represent 22.8 percent of the tax defer-
ral on this basis, and one may note that, because some of this deferral 
may be represented as deferred tax provisions in the accounts of MNCs, 
the actual impact on the tax charge in the accounts of MNCs may be 
lower than this implies without diminishing the cash loss to developing 
countries.
A ratio of this proportion allows ample margin for numerous other 
factors that may reduce declared tax rates, including advanced capital 
allowances (by far the biggest claimed factor in tax deferral noted in 
Murphy 2008), nonremittance of profits (perhaps transfer mispricing 
induced), tax holidays, and so on. If private company profits were to be 
included in the profit base on which the calculation has been under-
taken, the margin for these other factors would obviously be higher still.
What is clear is that these data suggest that US$160 billion in transfer 
pricing abuse affecting developing counties is plausible within the frame-
work of the world economy given what we know of corporate profits, 
corporate tax rates, and the opportunities for corporate tax planning.
The risk of being caught
If it is plausible that transfer mispricing of the suggested order may have 
taken place, we must then ask if the transfer mispricing could have taken 
place without detection or sanction.
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First, this would not happen if all corporations sought to be tax com-
pliant (see above). While some corporations are risk averse, by no means 
all are.16 In this case, it is unlikely that all corporations are tax compliant.
The likelihood of noncompliance is increased because of the limited 
application of the OECD arm’s-length pricing rules, which are meant to 
govern transfer pricing in international trade (see above). For the pur-
poses of this chapter, transfer mispricing is considered a breach of these 
rules. Because these rules usually only apply if legislation requires or if a 
DTA is in existence requiring the trade between two jurisdictions to be 
priced in accordance with these principles, it is likely that transfer mis-
pricing is commonplace.
In EU and OECD countries, which have been used as the basis for 
much of the published research on transfer mispricing, such DTAs usu-
ally exist, as do the resources to monitor the application of these agree-
ments. As a result, it is now often said at tax conferences that mispricing 
in the trade in goods is rare or almost unknown, although the same is 
not said of intangibles. Such comments, however, ignore the fact that 
this is a select sample base that gives little indication of the opportunity 
for abuse in much of the world.
For example, even a brief review shows clearly that DTAs are notable 
by their absence in Africa. While South Africa has an impressive range of 
DTAs, other countries are in a different position.17 Botswana has 10.18 
Zambia has 17, but most are old, and none has been signed since 1989.19 
The Democratic Republic of Congo has only two DTAs.20 Angola is far 
from alone in having no DTAs. The lack of progress in developing new 
agreements implies that the resources devoted to monitoring the issue 
are limited in Africa.
Especially since the G-20 summit in April 2009, DTAs have been sup-
plemented by new tax information exchange agreements. These, how-
ever, are limited to information exchange issues, as their name implies, 
and not the regulation of transfer prices (in other words, they exclude 
standard article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention; see OECD 2003). 
Moreover, as research by Tax Research LLP and the Tax Justice Network 
(TJN) has shown, as of November 2009, Brazil, China, Japan, India, most 
of Africa, and almost all developing countries were notable absentees 
from the list of states that had signed tax information exchange agree-
ments with secrecy jurisdictions (Murphy 2009b). The implication is 
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obvious: the places most likely to be subject to transfer mispricing abuse 
are also the places least likely to enjoy protection from such abuse.
It is accepted that other regulation, such as controlled foreign com-
pany rules, might limit the opportunity for such abuse, but, as secondary 
protection, they do not do so efficiently. First, they do not restore correct 
pricing between the parties that initiated the trade; so, tax remains inap-
propriately allocated to jurisdictions given that the application of these 
rules to transfer mispricing only gives rise to an additional tax payment 
in the jurisdiction in which the ultimate parent company is located, not 
in the jurisdiction that lost out initially. Second, the abuse has to be dis-
covered in the parent company jurisdiction. For the reasons noted below, 
this can be difficult. Consequently, the chance that transfer mispricing 
will take place without being detected is high.
The Particular Problem in Developing Countries
The issue of enforcing transfer pricing rules in developing countries is 
particularly acute, as many published reports have shown.21
Global Witness has published a report on the operations of Mittal 
Steel (now Arcelor Mittal) in Liberia. The report provides commentary 
on the tax provisions of Mittal’s mineral development agreement, noting 
that “probably the single biggest problem with this agreement is that it 
gives the company [Mittal] complete freedom to set the price of the iron 
ore, and therefore the basis of the royalty rate” (Global Witness 2006, 7).
There were no restrictions at all in the original agreement between 
Mittal Steel and Liberia on the transfer prices the company could use. As 
a result, while there is no suggestion of impropriety, the possibility that 
transfer mispricing occurred was increased by the absence of any regula-
tion intended to prevent it. In this case and as a direct result of the work 
of Global Witness, the contract was revised. The changes were noted in a 
new commentary issued by Global Witness, which reported that “under 
the amended agreement the [transfer] price is set under the arms length 
rule, which means that it will be based on the international market price 
of the ore” (Global Witness 2007, 1).
It would be pleasing to report that all such risks of transfer mispricing 
have been eliminated so speedily, but the evidence is clear that this is not 
the case. Problems with transfer mispricing have been found after similar 
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NGO studies of the extractive industries in many countries. For example, 
in Zambia, Christian Aid has stated that “in his budget speech in Febru-
ary 2006, the minister of finance estimated that the government was 
likely to receive less than US$11 million from royalty payments in 2006: 
that’s 0.1 per cent of the value of production in 2005” (Christian Aid 
2007, 24). Christian Aid believes that this is in no small part caused by 
transfer mispricing, which has an impact, in this case, on both royalty 
payments and declared taxable profits. This is unsurprising. The Invest-
ment Act 1993 of Zambia, like its predecessor, the 1991 Investment Act, 
does not address the issue of transfer pricing (Mwenda 1999). Nor, it 
seems, do many of the mineral development agreements that have been 
negotiated in Zambia. This is a situation that may have been addressed by 
amendments in the Zambian Income Tax Act, passed by parliament in 
April 2008, which stipulated that royalties are to be calculated based on 
the average monthly cash price on the London Metal Exchange, Metal 
Bulletin, or any other metals exchange as agreed with the government 
(Open Society Institute et al. 2009). The impact may be limited, however: 
most Zambian mineral development agreements have stability clauses 
exempting them from the effects of any changes in tax law for up to 20 
years (Christian Aid 2007).
In the logging sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Green-
peace notes as follows:
Internal Danzer Group documents show in great detail the price fixing 
arrangements between the Group’s Swiss-based trading arm Interholco 
AG and the parent firm’s logging subsidiaries in the DRC and the Repub-
lic of the Congo. The DRC-based Siforco sells its wood to Interholco at an 
official price below the true market value of the wood. The shortfall is 
made up through unofficial payments into offshore bank accounts in 
Europe. (Greenpeace 2008, 3)
A review undertaken for this report found no evidence that issues 
related to transfer pricing were addressed in five mineral development 
agreements signed from 1994 to 2007 between the government of Tan-
zania and companies mining gold in Tanzania. Royalty rates were funda-
mental to anticipated government revenues from royalties and, ulti-
mately, from profits in each case, but on no occasion was the basis 
specified for setting the price of exports. The tax base on which royalties 
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were to be charged was thus capable of discretionary determination by 
the company liable to make the payment of the taxes due. In addition, all 
the agreements include fiscal stability clauses, and most specify that the 
basis of the pricing of gold (even though unspecified) should not be 
unilaterally changed, presumably by the government of Tanzania. For 
this reason, recent changes to Tanzanian law introducing transfer pricing 
regulation are likely to have little or no impact in this critical Tanzanian 
export sector.
The problem has also been found within the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative. In a review of the first audit of the initiative in 
Ghana, Murphy (2007, 10) notes that the audit objective to “ascertain 
the appropriateness of payments made with regards to mineral royalties; 
ground rent; dividends; taxation on profits and for mineral rights” had 
not, in the opinion of the reviewer, been fulfilled, largely because of the 
use of indeterminate prices unrelated to verifiable benchmarks and the 
use of apparently uncorroborated exchange rates for valuing gold 
exports, both clear indications that proper transfer pricing controls were 
not in operation.
The evidence appears to be telling: there is a pattern of transfer pric-
ing abuse or at least the risk of such abuse in developing countries. The 
evidence from mineral development agreements implies there is no 
change in the prospects in this area even if legislation to introduce arm’s-
length pricing rules is enacted because companies in the extractive 
industries are almost entirely immune to legislative changes affecting the 
way in which their tax liabilities are computed for periods of up to 30 
years after signing mineral development agreements.
It is also important to note another key feature emphasized by this 
work: the transfer pricing abuse in these cases is highly unlikely to be 
motivated by taxes on corporate profits alone. The abuse is likely to 
extend to royalties, sales and purchase taxes, dividends, abuse of profit-
sharing agreements, and more. The incentives to abuse are high, indeed; 
the consequences of not tackling the issue are considerable; and the 
prospects for tackling the abuse within current legislative and contrac-
tual constraints are not good.
Even if arm’s-length transfer pricing rules do exist in developing 
countries, there appear to be almost insurmountable problems in enforc-
ing them. As one of the rare cases of suggested transfer pricing abuse 
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ever brought to court in Africa has shown (Unilever Kenya Ltd v. Com-
missioners of Income Tax, Kenya Income Tax Appeal 753, 2003), the 
absence of the accounts of the related party with whom trade was being 
undertaken in the destination jurisdiction is a significant cause of the 
failure to prove that profit was being shifted through the transfer mis-
pricing of goods; this is what the Kenyan authorities were seeking to 
prove had occurred using the OECD arm’s-length principle. Although 
the accounts in question were necessarily available to the group of com-
panies the Kenyan subsidiary of which made the appeal in this case, they 
were not made available to the court. It is likely that the withholding of 
this accounting data, albeit entirely legal, had a material impact on the 
resulting decision of the court in Kenya.
Secrecy prevented the proper determination of a transfer pricing 
issue in this case, whether rightly or wrongly. This is a recurring theme 
of work in this area, as is the persistence of the assertion that developing 
countries are particularly vulnerable to the effects of secrecy. If this is the 
case, it is important that the mechanisms for creating this secrecy that 
permits transfer mispricing to take place undetected, unchallenged, or 
uncorrected be considered. Unless it can be shown that corporations can 
make use of secrecy to achieve this outcome, then it remains implausible 
that transfer mispricing of the alleged scale takes place. If, in contrast, 
significant secrecy is available to corporations, then corporations have 
the opportunity to transfer misprice, as some believe is taking place.
How Multinational Corporations Exploit Secrecy
The modern MNC is a complex entity. This is not the place to explore all 
aspects of the nature of the MNC or the motivations for creating some 
of the structures MNCs use, but, without consideration of the interac-
tion of the corporation, jurisdictions, corporate law, and tax law, testing 
the proposition that transfer mispricing can take place within MNCs 
and be hidden from view within the accounts and financial statements of 
MNCs is not possible.
The MNC is almost invariably headed by a single company, the parent 
entity, which is almost always a limited liability corporation. The parent 
entity comprises a number of other, usually similar limited liability cor-
porations spread over one or more other jurisdictions. For example, in 
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the course of researching this report, we noted that United Kingdom–
based BP plc has more than 3,000 subsidiaries in over 150 jurisdictions.
Subsidiaries need not be limited liability corporations. As noted in 
International Accounting Standard 27 (IAS 27, 2009), a subsidiary is an 
entity, including an unincorporated entity such as a partnership, that is 
controlled by another entity (known as the parent).22 Subsidiaries can 
therefore also be limited liability partnerships in any form, whether 
trusts, charities, or other arrangements, but limited liability corpora-
tions are the most common by far. The key is that the parent company 
controls the subsidiary. Control is widely defined by IAS 27, but most 
commonly means that the parent has direct or indirect control of a 
majority of the equity shares.
However control is established, if a parent entity governed by the 
IFRSs (which, in this respect, operate almost identically to the U.S. Gen-
erally Accepted Accounting Principles) has subsidiary entities, then IAS 
27 requires that consolidated accounts and financial statements be pre-
pared. These are the financial statements of a group of entities presented 
as if they were those of a single economic entity.
It is immediately apparent that, within this requirement, there is an 
obvious conflict of interest. The parent entity of such a group may be 
required to present the group’s accounts as if the group were a single 
entity, and, yet, in practice, the group may be made up of thousands of 
entities that are under the control, but not necessarily the sole ownership 
of the parent entity. Thus, in substance, each entity within the MNC may 
remain legally distinct, and each may be subject to the rules of account-
ing, taxation, and disclosure of the jurisdiction in which it operates. In a 
real sense, each subsidiary is therefore without obligation to the other 
members of the group, bar the duty the directors and managers of the 
entity may owe to the owners to whom they report under the law of the 
jurisdiction in which the entity is incorporated, and this duty varies 
widely from place to place.
Curiously, according to the one nearly constant assumption in com-
pany law, the shareholders and the owner do not have the right to man-
age the entity: that right belongs to the directors. Of course, the share-
holders may have the right to appoint the directors, but, it is important 
to note, the assumption underpinning group accounts pierces the veil of 
incorporation that, in turn, underpins the notion of the limited liability 
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entity. The dichotomy is that the assumption accomplishes this in the 
effort to reinforce the division inherent in the act of incorporation 
through the presentation of the group as one undertaking distinct from 
the owners, who obtain only the limited information the directors may 
wish to supply, subject to legal constraints.
The inherent conflict in reporting results is exacerbated by a number 
of other factors. First, the definition of control used for accounting may 
be different from the definition used by some jurisdictions for tax. So, 
some entities that are within the group for tax purposes in some loca-
tions may not be within the group in other locations. For example, tax 
may require 75 percent control, while accounting requires 50.01 percent 
in most cases. Therefore, entities that, for accounting purposes, may be 
related parties requiring inclusion in a common set of consolidated 
accounts and financial statements may not be so treated for transfer 
pricing purposes.
Second, note that some entities are deliberately structured to exploit 
the rules on consolidated financial reporting. In particular, the financial 
services industry has become expert at creating orphan entities. These 
are companies that are created by a parent organization and that are 
deliberately structured by the parent entity so that they are off the bal-
ance sheet; thus, the assets or liabilities that the orphans own are excluded 
from consolidation in the parent entity’s accounts and financial state-
ments, as are the results of the trading of the orphans.
A common way to engineer this outcome is to create a company to 
which are transferred the off–balance sheet assets and liabilities the par-
ent entity wishes to hide from view. The new entity is owned by a chari-
table trust, for example. As such, it is not considered to be under the 
ownership or control of the parent entity. This is why it is described as 
an orphan; it has become parentless, although it is utterly dependent on 
the parent entity.
These entities are hard to spot, but commonplace. While the entities 
are used to exclude liabilities from accounts, the rules that permit this 
will, in most cases, also allow them to be used for transfer mispricing, 
which may pass undetected, subject to the caveat that the proceeds must 
then be used for purposes that the group may wish to keep at quasi-
arm’s length. This purpose may be fraudulent.
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Third, it is widely assumed that consolidated accounts and financial 
statements are created by adding together all the accounts of the indi-
vidual entities that make up the group and then eliminating all the intra-
group transactions and balances. This is a simplistic, but not wholly 
inappropriate view of what should happen. The reality is that MNCs can 
deliberately obscure the relationship between the underlying accounts 
and financial statements of the subsidiary companies and the group 
accounts in ways that make it almost impossible to detect what is really 
happening within the group.
The first method to achieve this is the use of different accounting 
year-end dates for group companies. IAS 27 (section 26) says this should 
not occur and that any differences should be explained, but the reality is 
(as the author has frequently witnessed) that noncoterminous year-ends 
are commonplace and almost never disclosed or commented upon. If 
noncoterminous year-ends are used, transfer mispricing may then be 
relied on to shift profits (and losses) around the group almost at liberty 
and almost entirely undetected.
Next, nonstandard accounting policies may be used in different places 
to recognize transactions even though, according to IAS 27, this should 
not occur. This is now commonplace. The parent company might 
account using IFRSs, but local entities may well account using local Gen-
erally Accepted Accounting Principles, and there is nothing to prevent 
this. Some significant transactions have different tax treatments depend-
ing on the accounting standards used. There are, for example, conflicts 
between the United Kingdom and the International Accounting Stan-
dards on financial derivatives for tax purposes. These differences and 
conflicts have been exploited by international banks.
In addition, entries can be made in the consolidated accounts alone, 
without ever appearing anywhere in any of the accounts of the underly-
ing entities. In principle, this should not occur because the accounts can 
then be said not to reflect the underlying books and records of the MNC 
that is publishing them, but, in practice, if the entries are considered a 
nonmaterial adjustment in the assessment from the point of view of the 
user of the financial statements, which both the International Account-
ing Standards Board and the U.S. Federal Accounting Standards Board 
define as “a provider of capital to the company,” then no auditor is likely 
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to object. This can, however, disguise radically different presentations of 
profit on trades between related undertakings in group consolidated 
accounts and financial statements and individual entity accounts and 
financial statements, especially if the tax implications are considered, so 
that the benefit may be hidden from view in the accounts of the group as 
a whole. Interview-based evidence indicates that this practice may be 
commonplace. It will never be discovered by tax authorities because it is 
the accounts and financial statements of the individual subsidiary enti-
ties that are used to determine tax liabilities in each jurisdiction in which 
these entities trade. The consolidated accounts and financial statements 
are deemed to have no tax interest to tax authorities (although it is not 
clear that this is true), and, as such, in jurisdictions such as the United 
Kingdom, the tax authorities are not entitled to ask questions about the 
entries that make up these published accounts.
This last point is, perhaps, of the greatest significance because the 
exact entries that are eliminated from view when the consolidated 
accounts and financial statements are prepared are those same transac-
tions that will always have the potential to give rise to transfer pricing 
disputes. For this reason, the most useful evidence that consolidated 
accounts and financial statements could provide to tax authorities—the 
data relating to transfer pricing issues, which are the data on the “most 
contentious issue in tax,” according to a poll of U.S. tax directors in 
2007—is denied to the tax authorities who need it.23
This omission is exacerbated by a number of other practices, all 
endorsed by the IFRSs and all of which make it easier to hide transfer 
pricing abuse. First, in the individual accounts and financial statements 
of the subsidiaries that make up an MNC, it would seem obvious that the 
transactions with other group companies should be highlighted if only to 
indicate that they will disappear upon consolidation. This is theoretically 
required by another International Accounting Standard, IAS 24, on 
related-party transactions. Broadly speaking, IAS 24 (section 9) defines a 
party as related to an entity if one party directly or indirectly controls the 
other, but associates, joint venturers, and some other arrangements are 
also included in the definition. IAS 24 defines a related-party transaction 
as a transfer of resources, services, or obligations between the related par-
ties regardless of whether a price is charged (section 9). As a result, it 
would seem that all transactions among group companies must be dis-
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closed in a group’s financial statements because a long list of disclosable 
transactions of this sort is included in the standard.
Unfortunately, the prospect of disclosure that this requirement cre-
ates is then dashed. IAS 24 proceeds to state that, while the disclosure 
must be made separately for the parent company, subsidiaries, and other 
identified categories of related parties, the information within each such 
category “may be disclosed in aggregate except when separate disclosure 
is necessary for an understanding of the effects of the related party trans-
actions on the financial statements of the company.” As a result, all trad-
ing by a subsidiary with all other subsidiaries can be aggregated into one 
number in most cases, and no indication need be given of the other 
party in a trade, what has been traded, or on what terms and where the 
other side of the transaction might be recorded.
The result is obvious: the accounts and financial statements end up 
providing no meaningful information at all on transfer pricing issues. 
The information is excluded from consolidated accounts and financial 
statements because related-party trades between parents and their sub-
sidiaries and between fellow subsidiaries are always excluded from these 
accounts, while the disclosure requirement on individual group mem-
bers is so limited that forming a view on transfer pricing is almost 
impossible in most cases: it is rare for the other party to any transaction 
to be disclosed, especially within a large and complex group.
This might be thought an accident. Regrettably it is not, as IAS 24 
makes clear. In the latest version of the standard, introductory note IN7 
states that “discussions [in the standard] on the pricing of transactions 
and related disclosures between related parties have been removed 
because the Standard does not apply to the measurement of related party 
transactions.”
This is an extraordinary statement. Accounts prepared under IFRSs 
and their U.S. equivalents are the basis of corporate taxation in a great 
many countries in the world, but the International Accounting Standard 
that is responsible for their promulgation says that it is not the purpose 
of the standard to assist in the measurement of matters related to trans-
fer pricing. Moreover, it offers no suggestion on how such matters should 
be considered or measured.
What is clear is that it is not the intent in the standards that the only 
other part of the IFRS environment that might provide information on 
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the issue—IFRS 8, on segment—do so. IFRS 8, by default, usually only 
applies to companies quoted on a stock exchange in a jurisdiction that 
has adopted IFRSs (as all countries in the EU have done, for example). It 
defines an operating segment as a component of an entity:
•  that engages in business activities from which it may earn revenues 
and incur expenses;
•  the operating results of which are reviewed regularly by the entity’s 
chief operating decision maker so as to make decisions about the 
resources to be allocated to the segment and assess its performance; 
and
•  for which discrete financial information is available.
IFRS 8 requires an entity to report financial and descriptive informa-
tion about the entity’s reportable segments. These are operating segments 
or aggregations of operating segments that account for more than 10 per-
cent of the revenues, profits, or assets of the entity. Smaller segments are 
combined until ones of this size are created, supposedly to reduce infor-
mation overload. In practice, this might, of course, hide necessary detail.
Required disclosure by reportable segments targets trading data, 
including profit and loss, assets and liabilities, and limited geographical 
analysis. Such a summary does not, however, show the true level of prob-
lems inherent within IFRS 8, which also allows segment data to be pub-
lished using accounting rules that are not the same as those used in the 
rest of the accounts and financial statements, meaning, as a result, that 
segment data may be formulated in a way harmful to the appraisal of 
transfer mispricing. In addition, IFRS 8 does not require that segments 
cover all of the MNC’s activities, meaning some information may be 
omitted, providing more opportunity for transfer mispricing to be hid-
den from view.
As a consequence, considerable support has developed for an alterna-
tive form of segment accounting called country-by-country reporting, 
created by the author of this report (Murphy 2009a). Country-by-coun-
try reporting would require an MNC to disclose the name of each coun-
try in which it operates and the names of all its companies trading in 
each country in which it operates. Currently, these data are usually 
unavailable. Country-by-country reporting would then require publica-
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tion of a full profit and loss account for each country in which the MNC 
operates, plus limited cash flow and balance sheet information. Radi-
cally, the profit and loss account would break down turnover between 
turnover involving third parties and turnover involving group entities. 
Costs of sale, overhead, and finance costs would have to be broken down 
in the same way, while a full tax note would be required for each country, 
as is presently necessary for IFRSs.
In addition, if the company operates within the extractive industries, 
one would also expect to see all those benefits paid to the government of 
each country in which the MNC operates broken down across the cate-
gories of reporting required in the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative.
As Murphy (2009a, 18) notes, “country-by-country reporting does 
not [stop transfer mispricing]. What it does do is provide data that . . . 
tax departments . . . can use to assess the likely risk that exists within the 
accounts of a multinational corporation. They can do this by
•  “Assessing the likelihood of risk within the group structure;
•  “Reviewing the overall allocation of profits to countries within the 
group to see if there is indication of systematic bias towards low-tax 
jurisdictions;
•  “Assessing whether the volume and flows of intragroup trading dis-
closed by country-by-country reporting suggests that this outcome is 
achieved as a result of mispricing of that trade;
•  “Using that information to assess where that abuse is most likely to 
occur so that an appropriate challenge can be raised.”
So far, the International Accounting Standards Board has only indi-
cated willingness to consider this issue with regard to the extractive 
industries, and current indications are that, despite the considerable lob-
bying, there is little prospect of an advance on this issue. The conclusion 
is inescapable: as one board member said when the issue of country-by-
country reporting was being discussed by the International Accounting 
Standards Board, “this looks like it deals with the issue of transfer pric-
ing, and we do not want to go there.”24 The comment is succinct and 
neatly summarizes the design of current accounting standards, which 
seem purpose-made to hide the subject of transfer pricing from view.
AU: Where 
is closing 
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The Role of Secrecy Jurisdictions
The literature that alleges substantial transfer mispricing abuse by MNCs 
also finds that tax havens play a significant role in the process. The term 
tax haven is, however, so widely misunderstood that this chapter does 
not use it, preferring instead to use the term secrecy jurisdiction. For a 
more detailed consideration of the term, the nature of a secrecy jurisdic-
tion, and the economic significance in the matters under consideration 
here, see chapter 11 in this volume. A list of the places currently consid-
ered significant secrecy jurisdictions is available in table 9A.4.25
The term secrecy jurisdiction is considered more appropriate for the 
purposes of the current analysis because, although the process of trans-
fer mispricing to which this chapter refers seeks to secure a tax advantage 
(by way of reduced tax payment) for those who pursue the activity, this 
advantage is not normally available unless the abuse giving rise to the 
advantage—the artificial relocation of activities to one or more secrecy 
jurisdictions—can be hidden from view behind a veil of secrecy. Secrecy 
jurisdiction opacity is often, of course, linked to low tax rates (see above).
The combination of low tax rates and secrecy has obvious attractions 
for those seeking to transfer misprice. However, to demonstrate whether 
or not MNCs actually use secrecy jurisdictions and which ones they 
might use if they do, TJN has coordinated, under the direction of the 
author of this chapter, a survey of the locations of MNC subsidiaries, 
paying particular attention to the secrecy jurisdictions TJN has identi-
fied. The results of the study by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office of December 2008 (GAO 2008), “Large U.S. Corporations and 
Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions Listed as Tax 
Havens or Financial Privacy Jurisdictions,” have been used as part of the 
survey. Because the U.S. survey excludes data on the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, these locations have also been 
excluded from the TJN survey. Austria (for practical rather than meth-
odological reasons), Belgium, and Madeira (because of difficulties in 
isolating data independently from Portugal) have also been excluded.
The total sample of MNCs surveyed is shown in table 9.4.
It should, however, be noted that the data selection has been prag-
matic: the U.K. data should have been the entire FTSE 100, that is, the 100 
largest companies in the United Kingdom, designed to match the U.S. 
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sample. In practice, although all United Kingdom–quoted companies are 
legally required to publish the names, places of incorporation, and per-
centage of the holdings for all their subsidiary companies annually either 
in their audited accounts and financial statements or as an appendix to 
their annual declaration made to the U.K. Registrar of Companies, only 
33 of the FTSE 100 companies did so. Enquiries found that no company 
had ever been prosecuted for failing to file this information. It is a curi-
ous example of the United Kingdom’s opacity (see table A9.5).26
It should also be noted that substantial problems were encountered 
with all other samples. The French data undoubtedly underreport the 
number of subsidiaries because they only relate to principal subsidiaries, 
not all subsidiaries. German companies do not always make the distinc-
tion between subsidiaries and associates clear. The Dutch and Swiss data 
have been taken from databases, not original documentation, which 
implies that there are inconsistencies in approach, particularly about 
whether dormant subsidiaries are counted or not, and so on. All such 
issues do, however, reveal one consistent theme: it is immensely difficult 
to determine the composition of an MNC.
Detailed analysis of the regulatory requirements of the 60 secrecy 
jurisdictions surveyed by TJN highlights the issues. Of the 60 jurisdic-
tions surveyed, accounts of companies were available on easily accessible 
public record in only six.27
Table 9.4. Multinational Corporations Surveyed by 
the Tax Justice Network 
number
Country MNCs sampled
France 39
Netherlands 23
United Kingdom 33
United States 100
Germany 28
Switzerland 20
Total 243
Source: Mapping Financial Secrecy (database), Tax Justice Network, 
London, http://www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/index.php (accessed 
December 12, 2009).
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Table 9.5. Secrecy Jurisdiction Locations of Multinational Corporation 
Subsidiaries 
number
Rank Secrecy jurisdiction MNC subsidiaries
1 Cayman Islands 1, 130
2 Ireland 920
3 Luxembourg 824
4 Switzerland 771
5 Hong Kong SAR, China 737
6 Singapore 661
7 Bermuda 483
8 Jersey 414
9 Hungary 252
10 British Virgin Islands 244
1 1 Malaysia (Labuan) 177
12 Mauritius 169
13 Bahamas, The 156
14 Guernsey 151
15 Philippines 126
16 Panama 125
17 Isle of Man 99
18 Costa Rica 85
19 Cyprus 69
20 Netherlands Antilles 68
21 Uruguay 67
22 Malta 60
23 United Arab Emirates (Dubai) 58
24 Israel 56
25 Gibraltar 54
26 Barbados 51
27 Latvia 40
28 U.S. Virgin Islands 37
29 Monaco 35
30 Liechtenstein 32
Source: Mapping Financial Secrecy (database), Tax Justice Network, London, http://www.secrecy 
jurisdictions.com/index.php (accessed December 12, 2009).
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The situation was worse for the beneficial (as opposed to nominal) 
ownership information on public record. Only Monaco requires that 
these data be available. In all other cases, nominee ownership may be 
recorded, or there is simply no requirement to record data on public 
record at all.28
It is readily apparent, as a consequence, that, unless data are required 
from MNCs on the companies making up or not making up their group 
and the operations of each, as shown by the audited accounts, then the 
current legal requirements for data registration within secrecy jurisdic-
tions ensure that the information required to assist in the appraisal of 
MNC activities, including those relating to transfer mispricing, will sim-
ply be unavailable to most people and, quite possibly, to many tax 
authorities if that is the MNC’s wish, as it will be if the MNC is seeking 
to hide transfer mispricing activity.
This would not be an issue if MNCs did not use secrecy jurisdictions. 
The reality is that they do use secrecy jurisdictions extensively. Of the 
European and U.S. samples, 97.2 and 84 percent, respectively, had secrecy 
jurisdiction subsidiaries as defined by the TJN. Table 9.5 indicates the 
number of subsidiaries by location according to the TJN survey. (Data 
on the 24 additional, smaller jurisdictions have been ignored; these juris-
dictions are immaterial for the purposes of this chapter.)
It is readily apparent that some locations stand out, but the data make 
a lot more sense if they are plotted against two control variables: popula-
tion and GDP (figure 9.4).
The data in figure 9.4 are ranked by the number of subsidiaries by 
GDP in billions of U.S. dollars. In most cases, the correlation with a 
ranking by the number of subsidiaries per head of population is clear. 
These weighted data give a much better view of the relative importance 
of these secrecy locations. It is apparent that some show extraordinary 
amounts of activity relative to their size. There is only one explanation 
for this: the secrecy jurisdictions are not creating entities for use by the 
local population, but, as the definition of these jurisdictions in this chap-
ter suggests is likely, for the use of people resident elsewhere. The com-
panies that are registered in these jurisdictions do little or nothing in 
these locations.
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That this must be true is indicated by the number of subsidiaries active 
in financial services as a proportion of the total working population in 
the secrecy jurisdictions. As TJN has noted, this exceeds 20 percent in 
Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, and Jersey and 10 percent in Ber-
muda, Liechtenstein, and Luxembourg.29 Financial service sectors of this 
size crowd out the possibility of any other significant economic activity 
taking place. The overlap between this list (figure 9.4) and the locations 
with the most MNC subsidiaries (table 9.5) is obvious, and the implica-
tion is clear: these locations do not create value. Their sole raison d’être is 
the provision of corporate and financial service structures that may 
record value, but do not generate it. Of course, one way in which this 
value may be relocated into these places is through transfer mispricing.
Figure 9.4. Top 20 Subsidiaries by Secrecy Jurisdiction, Population, and GDP
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The existence of the Big Four firms of accountants—Pricewater-
houseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, and KPMG—
in many secrecy jurisdictions in which their location cannot possibly be 
justified solely by the needs of the local populations reinforces this view. 
As Murphy (2010b) shows, the Big Four firms are significantly overrep-
resented in small secrecy jurisdictions (those with less than 1 million 
population) compared with other locations of this size (see table 9A.6).30 
As he also shows, these locations of the Big Four have an average GDP 
per head that is approximately four times greater than the average GDP 
in similar locations in which the Big Four are not present. Of course, 
cause and effect cannot be proven based on this circumstantial evidence, 
but the possibility exists, especially in the smallest of such locations, that 
the income in question is not earned in these places, but is transferred in 
through transfer mispricing, and, in that case, the Big Four firms, as 
Murphy suggests, facilitate the structures that allow the transfer mispric-
ing to occur.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought, first, to test the credibility of the claim that that 
at least US$160 billion a year may be lost by developing countries as a 
result of transfer mispricing by MNCs.
Second, it has sought to demonstrate that developing countries and, 
particularly, the extractive industries may be especially prone to this 
abuse.
Third, it has considered whether this sum may be hidden from view 
within the accounts or financial statements of the MNCs that may be 
perpetrating the mispricing.
Fourth, it has explored the possibility that these MNCs may use 
secrecy jurisdictions to assist in hiding these transactions from view.
As the chapter indicates, the incentive to transfer misprice is great. 
This is because, first, the differential in effective tax rates between the 
jurisdictions in potential supply chains is higher than the existing litera-
ture on tax rates suggests would normally be the case. Second, it is 
because the structure of international tax regulation at present suggests 
that the chance of detection of transfer mispricing is low.
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The chapter then shows that the risk that transfer mispricing may go 
undetected within the extractive industries that supply much of the 
external earning capacity of many developing countries is great. As the 
chapter also notes, transfer mispricing in this sector is unlikely to be 
motivated by a desire to avoid taxes on corporate profits alone. The 
abuse is likely to extend to royalties, sales and purchase taxes, dividends, 
abuse of profit-sharing agreements, and more. The incentives to abuse 
for all these reasons are substantial, and the consequence of not tackling 
the issue considerable, but, as the chapter shows, the prospects of tack-
ling the issue are limited given the current legislative and contractual 
constraints.
The chapter also reviews a number of IFRSs, in particular the standards 
addressing consolidated accounts and financial statements, related-party 
transactions, and segment reporting: the three standards most likely to 
relate to disclosure of intragroup trade within the accounts of MNCs. The 
analysis shows that these standards are not designed to and are not capable 
of leading to the disclosure of these transactions and the associated trans-
fer pricing. It proposes that this failure may be intentional.
The chapter defines secrecy jurisdiction and argues that secrecy juris-
dictions are deliberate constructs. Secrecy jurisdictions are used dispro-
portionately by MNCs as measured relative to local populations and 
GDP. In the secrecy jurisdictions most popular with the MNCs, there is 
little prospect of any real added value arising because, as the chapter 
shows, the economies of these secrecy jurisdictions are largely dedicated 
to the supply of financial services, part of which activity is administered 
by the MNC subsidiaries. This pattern of use does, however, accord with 
the proposed definition of a secrecy jurisdiction, suggesting that the pur-
pose of these jurisdictions is to disguise the true nature of activity under-
taken elsewhere so that compliance with the regulations of others states 
can be avoided or evaded. Transfer mispricing may be only one abusive 
activity that may be occurring.
What overall conclusions may one draw from this evidence? The fol-
lowing conclusions are proposed.
First, it is apparent that there is a stronger incentive to transfer mis-
price than the existing literature has suggested. Second, developing 
countries are particularly susceptible to this activity. Third, this activity 
can be hidden from view in accounts. Fourth, secrecy jurisdictions pro-
09--Chapter 9--000-000.indd   38 11/29/11   10:25 AM
 Accounting for the Missing Billions 39
vide an additional layer of opacity to disguise this activity. Fifth, the 
combination of the secrecy inherent in accounting rules and secrecy 
jurisdiction legislation provides a deep opacity that limits the possibility 
of discovering transfer mispricing activity. As a result, the chapter finds 
that transfer mispricing may be taking place undetected.
In this case, is it also plausible that the quantum of the loss to devel-
oping countries may be as much as US$160 billion per annum? As noted 
in the chapter, this seems to be quite plausible on the basis of data veri-
fied from a variety of sources and therefore considered a credible basis 
for the analytical review techniques common in auditing methodology.
Thus, on the basis of the methodologies noted, the chapter concludes 
that substantial transfer mispricing by major corporations contributing 
to a loss of at least US$160 billion a year to developing countries is plau-
sible in the context of the total likely corporate profits earned worldwide 
in a year.
Notes
 1. Transfer mispricing occurs if two or more entities under common control that 
are tra ax advantage that would not be available to third parties trading in the 
same goods or services across the same borders.
 2. The arm’s-length principle is the international standard that OECD member 
countries have agreed should be used to determine transfer prices for tax pur-
poses. It is set forth in article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, as follows: 
where “conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their 
commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made 
between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those 
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those condi-
tions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and 
taxed accordingly” (Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, “Annex 3: Glos-
sary,” OECD, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3343,en_2649_33753 
_37685737_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed October 13, 2011). See also chapter 7.
 3. IFFs are defined by Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) as “the proceeds from 
both illicit activities such as corruption (the bribery and embezzlement of 
national wealth), criminal activity, and the proceeds of licit business that become 
illicit when transported across borders in contravention of applicable laws and 
regulatory frameworks (most commonly in order to evade payment of taxes).”
 4. Secrecy jurisdictions intentionally create regulation for the primary benefit and 
use of nonresidents in the geographical domain. The jurisdiction regulation is 
designed to undermine the legislation or regulations of another jurisdiction. 
09--Chapter 9--000-000.indd   39 11/29/11   10:25 AM
40 Draining Development
The jurisdictions create a deliberate, legally backed veil of secrecy that ensures 
that those from outside who use the jurisdiction regulations cannot be identi-
fied by others.
 5. See World Factbook (database), Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
 6. Jurisdiction Centre (database), OCRA Worldwide, Isle of Man, United King-
dom, http://www.ocra.com/jurisdictions/index.asp.
 7. The table may be found on the website of this volume, http://www.xx.
 8. The table may be found on the website of this volume, http://www.xx.
 9. Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2003) are typical of the other surveys in 
that they also entirely ignore the tax haven–secrecy jurisdiction issue.
10 Jurisdiction Centre (database), OCRA Worldwide, Isle of Man, United King-
dom, http://www.ocra.com/jurisdictions/index.asp.
11. The table may be found on the website of this volume, http://www.xx.
12. Based on International Monetary Fund–World Bank data summarized at http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal) (accessed on March 3, 
2010). In each case, the data are in the range of US$60 trillion to US$61 trillion. 
Original sources are linked through the website noted.
13. Data of the U.K. Office for National Statistics.
14. HMRC (HM Revenue & Customs), 2009, “HM Revenue and Customs Annual 
Receipts,” data sheet, December, London, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/tax_
receipts/table1-2.pdf.
15. Data of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
16. Anecdotal evidence based on conversations with high-ranking officials of HM 
Revenue & Customs leads us to believe that approximately 35 percent of all large 
companies in the United Kingdom are considered to have little appetite for tax-
ation risk, while at least 40 percent are considered to have exposed themselves to 
high risk in the management of their taxation affairs.
17. See South African Revenue Service, http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=3906 
(accessed August 17, 2009).
18. Lowtax, Global Tax and Business Portal, “Botswana: Double Tax Treaties.” http://
www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/botswana/jbo2tax.html (accessed August 17, 2009).
19. Zambia Revenue Authority, “Tax Treaties.” http://www.zra.org.zm/Tax_Treaties_ 
Agreemnet.php (accessed August 17, 2009).
20. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, http://www.unctad.
org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs/dtt_Congo_DR.PDF.
21. It is appropriate to note that the author of this chapter has acted as adviser on 
transfer pricing or contractual issues to the authors of most of the reports 
referred to in this section.
22. See Standards (IFRSs) (database), International Accounting Standards Board, 
London, http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/IFRS.htm.
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23. For the citation, see “US Tax Directors’ Poll: TP Is Most Contentious Issue,” 
TP Week, December 12, 2007, http://www.tpweek.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID= 
1786798.
24. Reported by Richard Murphy, September 2006.
25. The table may be found on the website of this volume, http://www.xx.
26. The table may be found on the website of this volume, http://www.xx.
27. See Mapping Financial Secrecy (database), Tax Justice Network, London, http://
www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/index.php (accessed December 12, 2009).
28. See Mapping Financial Secrecy (database), Tax Justice Network, London, http://
www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/index.php (accessed December 12, 2009).
29. See Mapping Financial Secrecy (database), Tax Justice Network, London, http://
www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/index.php (accessed December 16, 2009).
30. The table may be found on the website of this volume, http://www.xx.
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